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Abstract: For more than two decades, Sudan experienced a violent conflict, opposing the 
Northern Arab Muslim dictatorial government and the Southern Christian and Animist rebels. 
Often considered as an example of the ‘clash of civilisations’, this conflict is actually 
characterised by deep political and socio-economic inequalities. For the largest country in 
Africa, the promises of peace came with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed on 9 
January 2005. But peace in Sudan is still uncertain, challenged by obstacles to the 
implementation of the Agreement, by genocidal violence in Darfur and an increasing instability 
in the East. Through a rigorous analysis of the complexities of war and peace in Sudan, this 
paper aims to analyse the recent developments of the peace process and the challenges posed to 
the prospects for a more peaceful and prosperous future in the country.  
 
 
Introduction 
The conflict in Sudan, opposing the Northern dictatorial Muslim government and the 
Southern Christian and Animist rebels, has long been considered one of the longest and most 
violent in Africa.  
For the largest country in the African continent, the promises of peace have been 
materialized in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on 9 January 2005, which 
has put a formal end to the North-South war, and in the Darfur Peace Agreement, signed on 5 
May 2006. Despite these efforts, Sudan still lives an uncertain peace, made difficult not only 
by the many and complex obstacles to the implementation of the peace agreements, but also 
because it has been severely challenged by the escalating violence in Darfur and by an 
increasing instability in the Eastern parts of the country. 
Through a rigorous look into and analysis of the complexity of war and peace in 
Sudan, this paper seeks to evaluate the recent developments of the Sudanese peace process 
and understand the challenges to the prospects for a more prosperous and peaceful future in 
the country. For this, I will resort to a theoretical framework that distinguishes and analyses
                                                 
1 Teaching Assistant at the Department of International Relations of the Faculty of Economics, University of 
Coimbra (Portugal). PhD student, International Politics and Conflict Resolution Program, University of 
Coimbra. 
Sudan: Between the Promise of Peace in the South and the Uncertainty of War in Darfur 
2 
several perspectives on the role of ethnic and/or religious cleavages as a source of conflict: 
primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism. 
 
 
The role of ethnicity and religion in the Sudanese conflicts: A theoretical interpretation  
Conflicts in the South and in Darfur and the latent violence in the Eastern regions of Sudan 
seem, in this context, to be seen as part of a same trend, shared by the various rebel 
movements, in which the ‘enemy’ is a particular Arab-Muslim elite that has been controlling 
the political, economic, social and cultural life of the country, neglecting and repressing a 
significant part of the Sudanese population. Sudan is, therefore, particularly interesting and 
illustrative of the theoretical debate on the role of ethnic and religious divisions as a cause of 
conflict. This debate opposes three different perspectives: primordialism, instrumentalism and 
constructivism. Although there are some important divergences in relation to a direct relation 
between ethnic and/or religious diversity and the emergence of conflict between groups 
within the same State, conflicts in Sudan have for long been interpreted as a perfect example 
of the primordialist argument, according to which such differences are the most important 
independent variables for explaining internal conflicts. In this view, conflicts become 
inevitable in multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies due to the existence of different 
interpretations of what is sacred or culturally acceptable by those groups (Hasenclever e 
Rittberger, 2000: 644). 
Instrumentalists, on the other hand, tend to recognise the importance and role of ethnic 
and religious differences, as well as their impact in conflicts, but refuse to consider them as 
their main causes. It is admitted therefore that conflicts may be aggravated, but rarely, if ever, 
caused by divergent religious beliefs or ethnic identities (Hasenclever e Rittberger, 2000: 
642). In the quest for alternative explanations for the emergence of conflicts, instrumentalism 
focuses on the crucial and often determinant role played by deeper and structural causes, such 
as political and socio-economic inequalities that characterise these contexts. In this approach, 
elites play a fundamental role, in the sense that they frequently use these identities to explain 
group inequality and discrimination, resorting to and justifying the use of violence to achieve, 
maintain and increase political and economic power. From this point of view, the governing 
Arab-Muslim elite in Sudan has been feeding this process, often using religious and ethnic 
identities as inclusion and exclusion factors for the rest of the Sudanese population, and 
feeding a war that lasted about four decades. 
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The constructivist thesis, on the other hand, suggests that there is nothing inherently 
conflictual about ethnicity or religion, but that, in certain circumstances, this type of identity 
may well move from a relatively neutral organisational principle to a powerful instrument for 
mobilisation and legitimisation of violence (USAID, 2005). According to this view, social 
conflicts are intimately linked to cognitive structures, such as ideology, nationalism, ethnicity 
or religion, structures that attribute to certain social actors certain conceptions of themselves 
and, consequently, affect their behaviour within the society (Hasenclever e Rittberger, 2000: 
647). Constructivists thus propose to consider religion and ethnicity as an intervening variable 
between a certain conflict and the option for conflicting behaviour, but its impact may be 
ambiguous: it can either make violence more likely or reduce it significantly (Hasenclever e 
Rittberger, 2000: 649). 
Drawing from this analysis, one of the main causes allegedly behind such persistent 
conflicts in Southern Sudan that have spilled over to Darfur has been, in my opinion, the 
equally persistent marginalisation of, and disrespect for, the groups and population that have 
been opposed to the repressive and discriminatory policies of the Sudanese government. 
But unlike what a more simplistic interpretation might assume, conflicts in Sudan – a 
country that has been leading the Failed States Index since 2006, with some of the highest 
indicators of political, economic and social instability from a list of about sixty countries2 – 
do not correspond to a ‘clash of civilizations’3 made inevitable simply because ethnic or 
religious diversity is seen as an almost natural obstacle to people’s peaceful coexistence. This 
approach thus hides a more complex history of asymmetries and inequalities at the political, 
economic, social and cultural level altogether, made unbearable by a rich and sectarian elite 
and victimising an impoverished Sudan, in particular the South, Darfur and East. It is thus 
defended that sustainable peace in a country where underdevelopment and war have 
apparently become endemic and irreversible, depends mainly on the recognition of those 
inequalities and asymmetries and of the perverse use of ethnic and religious identities made 
by the various Sudanese governments. 
                                                 
2 These indicators are, for example, number of refugees and displaced persons, human rights violations, unequal 
development, lack of State legitimacy, public services, and corruption, among others. 
[http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3420&page=1] 
3 Expression used by Samuel P. Huntington (1996) to characterise the new paradigm of international conflicts 
after the end of the Cold War. According to this argument, the new world conflicts would oppose different 
identity and religious civilisations.  
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I will now try to understand whether and how dominant, internationally defined 
conflict resolution strategies have been able, or willing, to respond to and tackle such complex 
causes and dynamics of conflict in Sudan. 
 
 
From Addis Abeba to Naivasha: Three decades of a complex North-South peace process  
Immediately after independence in 1956, Sudan was thrown into conflict as a result of 
discriminatory policies during the colonial rule by the Anglo-Egyptian administration4 but 
also, and to a great extent, of the independence aspirations of the Southern states which were 
not equally considered by the government in Khartoum. 
Torn by war ever since independence, Sudan has only experienced about eleven years 
of an extremely unstable peace between 1972 and 1983, as a result of the Addis Abeba peace 
agreement. The period of peace was always fragile due to the maintenance of an aggressive 
policy towards the South that culminated with President Nimieri’s decision to suspend the 
agreement and impose the Shari’a law to the whole territory of Sudan, including the 
predominantly Animist and Christian South. The governmental strategy of conscious social, 
political and economic neglect of the Southern regions of Sudan continued after independence 
and was even reinforced after the 1989 military coup that put General Omar-al Beshir in 
power and who, until today, heads a particularly repressive and authoritarian regime, based on 
a very strict vision of Islam. 
Ever since then, political instability and internal conflict have been a trend in Sudan, 
resulting in a generalised impoverishment of the Sudanese population. At the same time, 
Southern claims were crystallised around the Sudan’s People Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A), the only rebel group capable of confronting, both militarily and politically, and 
putting pressure on the Arab- Muslim government and its aggressive nationalist and radical 
Islamic project.  
Like the war, the Sudanese peace process has also been particularly long and complex. 
Absent, for decades, from the international agenda, it was only after the mid-90s that the 
Sudanese conflict managed to garner enough international involvement and attention, crucial 
to initiate and support a credible and sustainable peace process. With George W. Bush as 
                                                 
4 During the Anglo-Egyptian rule, there was the establishment of a Southern Policy, which implied a separate 
political, educational and socio-economic system for the North and the South and which formally treated 
Southerners as ‘second-class’ citizens. 
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President of the United States in 2000, there was a significant shift in international attention to 
Sudan not only as a result of oil-related interests, but also of the significant internal pressure 
by the Christian groups and communities which pushed the U.S. administration to a more 
leading role in the peace process. Washington then became more actively involved in the 
conflict, considering Sudan as a central piece of American involvement in Africa, a position 
that was reinforced in 2001. 
In fact, the Sudanese government, which had been the target of bilateral sanctions 
imposed by the Clinton administration since 1997,5 desperately wanted to improve its 
international image as well as its relations with Washington, an opportunity that came after 
the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Khartoum used the subsequent war on terrorism to offer its 
support, including the opening of its air space – something that was not immediately 
guaranteed by many of the European allies –  and authorisation to conduct investigations on 
the existence of terrorist training camps, allegedly created when Osama bin Laden lived in 
Sudan between 1990 and 1996, under protection of the Sudanese government. After 
nominating John Danforth as U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan in 2001, Bush decided to condition 
the suspension of the sanctions to the signing of a final peace agreement, becoming actively 
and directly involved in the peace process, with an important achievement with the 2002 
Machakos Protocol. 
Following Machakos, the CPA, officially signed on 9 January 2005, under the 
auspices of IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development) and the Troika, composed 
by the USA, Norway and the UK, aimed at putting a definite end to a conflict that had caused 
more than two million deaths and about four million refugees and displaced persons over 
more than two decades. This agreement is indisputably important due to the inherent 
complexity of this conflict and to a history characterised by decades of frustrated attempts to 
negotiate peace and of failed cease-fires between the main belligerents –the government led 
by General Omar-Beshir ever since 1989,6 and the rebels of the SPLM/A, led by the 
charismatic John Garang.7  
                                                 
5 A year after the UN had imposed international sanctions that lasted until 2001. 
6 Omar Hasán al-Beshir took power in 1989 following a military coup supported by the National Islamic Front, 
proclaiming a fundamentalist Islamic regime which has been in power since then, on the basis of unfair and 
fraudulent elections. 
7 John Garang was the historic leader of Southern rebels. His death in a helicopter accident in July 2005, just a 
few months after the signing of the CPA and his nomination as Vice-President, deeply affected the still fragile 
prospects for peace in the territory. 
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From the 1972 agreement, signed in Addis Abeba, to the 2002 Machakos Protocol and 
the CPA in 2005, both parties showed a clear and continuous disrespect for the established 
provisions and cease-fires. It is exactly this past of failures and lack of commitment by both 
parties that render Sudan’s future so uncertain when it comes to sustainable peace. 
 
 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement: ambitions and ambiguities  
The Naivasha Agreement is a complex and ambitious one, and it includes protocols on 
fundamental issues related to the State and religion, self-determination, power and wealth-
sharing, security and the special status of the border areas of Abyei, Nuba Mountains and the 
Blue Nile (also know as the ‘Three Areas’), as well as a separate set of implementation 
mechanisms. It establishes, above all, the adoption of a new national Constitution as well as a 
six-year interim period, with elections in 2009 and a final referendum in 2011, to decide on 
the future of the South as an independent state or its continuation as part of a united Sudan. 
The CPA also involves an oil sharing protocol resulting from the oil production, which 
establishes an equal share to both North and South,8 as well as the sharing of seats in 
government.9 From an economic point of view, it is expected that during the interim period 
two currencies coexist within a dual banking system; the same logic applies to the military 
area, with the creation of two distinct armies for both territories, and a mixed army for the 
three sensitive areas.10 
In what concerns legislation applicable to the territory – by far one of the most 
controversial issues and often the cause of radicalisation of the conflict, due to a severe 
Arabisation policy and strategy imposed by Beshir’s fundamentalist government – it is 
                                                 
8 The oil reserves, mainly concentrated in Southern territories, have been ever since the beginning a fundamental 
element of conflict, leading to Northern incursions for their control. Until the CPA, the gains were channelled 
exclusively to the Northern Muslim governing elites, excluding the Southern regions as well as other regions of 
the country (Darfur, East). With the peace agreement, a wealth sharing protocol is established and accepted 
according to an equality principle (50%/50%).  
9 The seats in the transitory government of national unity would be divided according to a 70:30 principle 
favouring the government, and 55: 45 in favour of the government in what concerns the disputed bordering areas 
of Abyei, Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile. When the agreement was signed, Beshir was reinforced as head of 
government and Garang was nominated Vice-President.  
10 The status of the three regions is important but fragile within the CPA. Although these are mainly Christian 
and Animist areas, they were put under Northern administration with the Addis Abeba agreement of 1972. 
Supported by the local population, the SPLM/A has claimed the inclusion of these regions as constituting parts 
of the South, contradicting the governmental position aimed at maintaining control and authority over such oil-
rich areas (Prunier, 2002). In relation to Abyei, for example, the agreement gives the population the right to 
decide, through referendum, under whose authority it prefers to stay, at the same time recognising the possibility 
of double citizenship during the interim period, creating a ‘bridge’ area between North and South Sudan (Deng, 
2006: 160). 
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established that the Islamic law (Shari’a) will only be imposed in the North and not to the 
non-Muslim communities of the South. The status of the Shari’a in the capital, Khartoum, 
was to be decided by an elected Assembly.11  
From a political point of view, however, the CPA is ambiguous, since even though it 
establishes a government of national unity, it also clearly opens the way to secession, 
allowing a scenario of a political and territorial independent Southern Sudan to which it 
actually contributes by recognising the right to an autonomous army, banking system, 
currency and flag. The possibility of secession of the South, as it is established within the 
CPA, poses important challenges to current strategies for conflict resolution, namely in 
Africa. In fact, the principle and practice of self-determination of territories as solution to end 
conflicts in divided societies has been, for decades, absent from national and international 
agendas due to a fear of opening a ‘Pandora box’ that could undermine and put at risk the 
already fragile stability of a continent whose borders have been, for centuries, questioned in 
what concerns the correspondence between national State and the groups within it. For the 
first time in African history, a peace agreement establishes the possibility and the right of a 
territory to secede, thus calling into question and eroding the basic rule adopted by the 
Organization for African Union (currently African Union), following the wave of 
independence, that African borders should never be changed.12 As Gwynne Dyer remarks, 
after independence African borders became sacred not because they made sense but exactly 
because they didn’t. Considering that these borders essentially correspond to arbitrary lines, 
mixing different cultural, ethnic and linguistic peoples in defined and unitary spaces, any 
attempt to change borders is feared to result in regional instability, since there is no single 
border in Africa that could not be, justifiably, subject to change (Dyer, 2005). 
In the case of Sudan, the question of self-determination and independence of the South 
is even more complex and less consensual. The official goal of the SPLM/A was always a 
struggle for a different Sudan, free from discriminatory Islamic policies and where the various 
regions could have active, effective and equal participation. The Sudanese government itself, 
aware of the risks of an eventual territorial partition, always defended a united country, 
especially because the main oil reserves are located in the Southern regions. Therefore, the 
                                                 
11 In what concerns legislation, the status of Khartoum was one of the most controversial issues during the 
negotiations, since the government demanded the maintenance of the Shari’a since it is situated in the North, 
whereas the SPLM/A defends the religious neutrality of Khartoum as the capital of a religiously heterogeneous 
country. 
12 Even the case of Eritrea and Ethiopia, in the 1990s, must be seen as an exception, since even during 
colonialism the territory was considered and treated as a separate entity. 
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acceptance of an interim period, which has as a final goal the referendum, may contradict 
Khartoum’s aspirations and desires, and had as a fundamental basis the expectation that in the 
following six years the government would, through rhetoric and development projects 
supported by the international community, try to convince the Southern population that they 
would no longer be treated as second-class citizens and that it was ‘safe’ to choose for unity 
instead of secession. In fact, it was believed that the government in Khartoum would do 
everything possible to make ‘unity attractive’. And although the 2002 Machakos Protocol, 
which served as a basis for the negotiation of the following protocols and agreements, 
considered the possibility of secession after a defined and agreed timeline, it also incorporated 
the idea of a united Sudan as an Islamic state, with a separate Southern regional 
administration and government, allowing the creation of conditions capable of ‘seducing’ the 
Southern populations to voluntarily decide to continue as part of a united Sudan. 
Besides these important and fundamental issues, the CPA is also quite fragile in 
relation to the legitimacy of the actors involved and to the absence of references to some 
fundamental issues. One of the most controversial aspects has been the fact that, ever since 
the beginning, the negotiations involved only the two main belligerent parts, with the 
particularity that none of its leaders had been democratically elected by the population they 
both claimed to represent. The multiplicity of actors involved in the conflict – and which also 
reflects the enormous diversity of Sudan – not all recognised and having their own agendas 
and claims, would certainly make the negotiations even more difficult. It was probably this 
awareness of the obstacles posed by multiple and different actors involved in the negotiations 
that lay behind the international decision of limiting the negotiations to both government and 
the SPLM/A, in a clear attempt to facilitate a consensus in the main questions in dispute.13 
This does not prevent, however, the remaining groups to consider that as long as they are 
excluded from the negotiations, these will not be more than mere agreements between two 
dictators, without any legitimacy (Rone, 2003). 
The final outcome of these intense negotiations between North and South is also 
fragile because of the absence of any reference to criminal responsibility and accountability 
mechanisms of the parties in terms of human rights violations, in a conflict where massive 
violations have been an intrinsic part of the strategies of both parties. This vacuum ends up 
                                                 
13 Besides that, there was the fear that recognising legitimacy to some other groups to participate in the 
negotiations would result in a ‘domino effect’, leading to similar demands by other unsatisfied regional 
movements. 
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crystallising impunity and the maintenance of power in the hands of the same individuals 
who, for decades, were responsible for a particularly violent and brutal conflict.14 
Despite President Beshir’s openness in some issues and of the main public statements 
in favour of the freedom of choice by the Southern population to decide their own future, 
there are reasons for scepticism since none of the parties seem to be actively and truly 
committed to peace. And there is a growing conviction, reinforced by evidence in the 
implementation phase, that the negotiations focused more on the balances of power than on 
the deeper causes of the conflict that devastated the country for decades (Johnson, 2004: xx). 
It then follows that, in a conflict that did not end with the military victory of one of the 
parties, the agreement basically guaranteed a fragile compromise in terms of power sharing, 
with all the limitations that such a compromise originates when it involves actors who do not 
trust each other.  
At this level, there are important challenges to both parties: on one side, the profound 
change in the party currently in power and responsible for an authoritarian and repressive 
policy of Arabisation of the Christian and Animist South; and on the other side, the 
conversion of a military rebel group into a political party capable of democratically governing 
the South. The death of John Garang, the charismatic leader of the SPLM/A rendered these 
challenges even more difficult, since the South will hardly find a leader equally capable of 
contradicting all the internal tensions within Southern movements and this may undermine the 
prospects for a sustainable peace in the territory. Salva Kiir, current Vice President of the 
Government of National Unity following Garang, has proved already not to be capable of 
uniting the South or even challenging Beshir’s authoritarian behaviours. It is also worth 
underlining that the Sudanese government has always known how to use such Southern 
divergences to its own benefit, by successfully using the ethnic and religious hatred discourse 
and by arming the opposing militias (Hamilton, 2005). 
Three years since the signing of the CPA nothing structural seems to have 
fundamentally changed in order to create the conditions for overcoming conflict and building 
peace, especially in Southern Sudan. Millions of people are still displaced and deprived of 
socio-economic conditions to survive, while corruption seems to be spreading among the 
                                                 
14 The government of Khartoum has been particularly reluctant to accept any initiative that may lead to the 
criminal responsibility for crimes committed during the conflict. This position was reinforced recently after the 
Security Council decided to initiate investigations under the ICC for crimes in Darfur (SC Resolution 1593, 
April 2005). President Beshir made clear that he rejected the Resolution and would not cooperate with the ICC 
since Sudan has not yet recognised the Rome Statute. 
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main political leaders in the Southern government who are enjoying the massive oil dividends 
guaranteed and managed within the framework of the oil sharing agreement. 
In this scenario, it seems that despite creating the conditions for political 
accommodation of the parties in conflict, the impact of international involvement has been 
seriously limited by a simplistic perception of the real causes of conflict between Northern and 
Southern Sudan. Therefore, it is yet to be proved that the CPA will actually be able to open the 
way to sustainable peace, a peace that goes beyond the simple absence of armed violence. 
 
 
Darfur and the East: Perils and promises of peace in Sudan  
Despite some developments and advances in the political peace process in the South, the 
prospects for peace in the whole country and the success of the CPA are also to a great extent 
dependent on the dramatic situation in Darfur, characterised since 2003 by a violent conflict 
that opposes Muslim communities (nomadic Arabs and sedentary Africans) and which has 
become one of the latest chapters in the history of civil wars in Sudan. In February 2003, as 
the Southern peace process evolved, reports released by several humanitarian organizations in 
the field drew attention to massacres and forced displacement of Darfurian population, 
perpetrated by the Janjaweed, an armed militia allegedly supported by the government of 
Khartoum, as well as to confrontations between the two main rebel groups in the region – the 
Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) – and 
the government. 
Both conflicts are different but related, and this relation results from an escalation of 
violence in the whole territory of Sudan since 1998 and from an increasing and indisputable 
polarization of these conflicts around the ideas of race and ethnicity. Violence in Darfur 
increased when the rebel groups in the region tried to get some benefits from the peace 
process in the South, especially in terms of wealth and power-sharing. It is even considered 
that the decision of the Darfur Liberation Front to change its name to Sudan Liberation Army 
in March 2003, with the declared goal of gaining a more significant national and international 
profile and support, was largely influenced by the rapid pace of the peace negotiations in the 
South (Johnson, 2005: ix). 
The Darfur rebel groups also contested decades of political and socio-economic 
marginalisation by the central government. Once one of the most prosperous regions of 
Sudan, Darfur was progressively subjected to political and economic neglect by the 
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successive governments and regimes, but in particular by the dictatorial and sectarian 
government of Beshir. Besides this marginalization and neglect, the region has also been 
frequently affected by intense and recurrent droughts that destroyed, in certain areas 
irreversibly, an important part of its agricultural and cattle activity. The reaction of Khartoum 
to the alleged genocide being committed in Darfur has been one of denial of any involvement 
of its military forces in the attacks to the population, considering them as mere ‘tribal’ 
clashes. At the same time, it has progressively and increasingly limited the access of 
humanitarian organizations to the territory. 
Initially, the main international actors involved in the Southern peace process, namely 
the USA and some European countries such as Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom, chose 
to ignore what was going on in Darfur, fearing that such atrocities and the humanitarian crisis 
could have a negative impact on the outcome of the peace negotiations. Only when violence 
arose and the humanitarian crisis was clear and actually directly affected the viability of an 
agreement with the South, did the international community threatened to intervene to solve 
the conflict through political and economic sanctions by the United Nations. In July 2004, 
pressure involved the classification of what was going on as ‘genocide’ and the threat of a 
more firm action if the Sudanese government did not control the militias.  
These pressures led only to the acceptance of the presence of a reduced military 
contingent from the African Union without a sufficiently strong mandate, and in a fragile 
cease-fire between the government and the rebels, signed in N’djamena in April 2005, but 
which was violated shortly after due to new attacks on the population. In mid July 2004, Colin 
Powell, former U.S. Secretary of State, circulated a project Resolution at the United Nations 
Security Council where the Khartoum government was threatened with non-specified 
sanctions if it did not comply with the Joint Action Plan agreed upon between the Sudanese 
government and the UN Secretary General on July 3rd 2004. According to this plan, efforts 
would be undertaken to protect refugees and displaced persons, disarm militias and bring to 
international justice those responsible for human rights violations and atrocities in Darfur. 
The difficulty in reaching an agreement within the Security Council led Washington to 
withdraw the reference to sanctions in the Resolution text due to the clear opposition of eight 
of its fifteen members, including China and Russia. In its final text, the Resolution established 
a thirty-day deadline for the Sudanese government to comply with the promises; in case of 
non-compliance the Resolution left open the possibility of other actions by the Security 
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Council, including measures under article 41 of the UN Charter.15 The Resolution was 
adopted on July 31, with the abstention of China and Pakistan. 
The lack of consensus within the Security Council in relation to the type of 
intervention to be undertaken in Darfur,16 as well as many broken promises by the 
government in terms of disarmament and control over the militias and putting an end to the 
massacres in the region, have resulted in a total absence of strong international action in face 
of such a grave and obvious humanitarian crisis. Adding to this complexity, the regime in 
Khartoum declared at the time that any international decision to undertake military 
intervention would be considered an act of aggression to and interference with the national 
sovereignty of Sudan, and the government would respond accordingly. The threat went even 
further: in case of non-consented military intervention, Darfur would become a ‘grave’ for 
international forces.  
After four years of significant deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Darfur and 
numerous stalemates in a peace process involving the highest representatives of the 
international community and some of the belligerent parties, a peace agreement was finally 
signed on 5 May 2006 in Abuja. Led by the African Union representatives and by the then 
U.S. Under-Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick, and representing a relative success of 
American voluntarism for Darfur, this agreement established, for the first time, the acceptance 
of a UN force to support the insufficient African Union force in the territory. The most 
important points in the agreement included also restrictions on the movements of the Popular 
Defence Forces, as well as a decrease in their contingents, the integration of the leader of the 
major rebel force (SLA) in the government of National Unity, the establishment of buffer 
zones around the refugee camps and humanitarian corridors.  
Although indisputably important in the attempt to put a formal end to the violence in 
Darfur and promote the improvement of bilateral relations with Chad (which had been 
deteriorating ever since instability in the region started due to massive waves of refugees who 
crossed the border), this agreement was implemented with a prudent optimism. First of all, 
because it was signed only by the Sudanese government and one of the rebel groups in the 
region (the majority faction of SLA/M), undermining its implementation and risking a very 
                                                 
15 Which excludes military action, but allows economic and diplomatic sanctions. 
16 China threatens to veto any resolution that legitimises a UN military intervention in the region, or even the 
imposition of sanctions to Beshir’s regime. Chinese interests in Sudan are based on a privileged relation with 
Khartoum and on benefits from oil exploitation.  
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limited impact in the field.17 Secondly, because, like in the CPA with the South, both parties 
ended up giving in significantly to the external pressure, making the success of the agreement 
dependent also on the real and active commitment of the international community in making 
parties comply with the agreement. 
If, at a first sight, this international pressure could become a fundamental element to 
putting an end to such a humanitarian crisis in the region, the truth is that it did not happen, 
mainly because effective pressure implies that peace and the success of the agreements 
depend significantly on continued attention and real commitment by the international 
community in guaranteeing compliance and respect for the agreement. And as the past 
decades and years have painfully shown in relation to the events in Southern Sudan and 
Darfur, this attention and commitment are not always guaranteed. The direct involvement of 
isolated countries or regional organizations (like the European Union or the African Union) 
has been, ever since the beginning, seriously limited by the different interests involved. In 
fact, the interests of the several external actors involved are many and, above all, highly 
incompatible. The United States, China, the European Union and the African Union have 
different assumptions and play on different grounds when it comes to the priorities and 
responses to the crisis. With this attitude they keep calling into question and undermining any 
possibility of consensual position when it comes to the importance of imposing real pressure 
on the Sudanese government. The latter has proved to be expert in misleading and ‘playing’ 
with the various international actors, making demands on the composition of a hybrid 
peacekeeping force in the region, as well as on the time frames for its deployment, and the 
international community has complied with these demands by accepting them or simply by 
not acting. The Sudanese government has managed, progressively, to accomplish two of its 
main goals: disarm rebel groups, and win time, without being held directly responsible for 
delays and failures of peace agreements.  
In the case of the United States, for example, there is clearly a cautious strategy vis-à-
vis the type of pressure imposed in order not to affect its cooperation with the war on 
terrorism, where the Sudanese government has been an important ally, sharing information 
and opening its air space. Only these strategic concerns can explain why, even after 
considering the situation as constituting genocide, no action was taken in order to comply 
with the international legal responsibilities. 
                                                 
17 For example, the Janjaweed militia were not even represented in the negotiation, reinforcing the idea that they 
did not feel compelled or constrained to respect the agreement at all, seriously undermining its viability.  
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The European Union, in its turn, has assumed a very ambiguous position without any 
real pressure mechanism that may lead to an effective resolution of the conflict. The several 
declarations condemning the atrocities committed by the militias in the region, allegedly with 
governmental support, have not been followed by any firm action, thus undercutting the 
credibility of Europe’s common position in relation to the most appropriate responses to such 
conflicts. Nevertheless, the decision not to leave the Darfur problem out of the recent EU-
Africa Summit, even if without any specific measures (except for the common declaration on 
the need for the rapid deployment of a hybrid military force), may well result in a European 
foreign policy that puts more pressure on the Sudanese government. 
Finally, and in relation to the role of the African Union, it is not easy to demand a firmer 
attitude from an organization where most member states have a very doubtful record when it 
comes to respect for and compliance with fundamental human rights. Despite its great potential, 
the political reality of the African Union makes it an extremely fragile organization in what 
concerns its capacity to maintain regional peace and stability.  Nevertheless, there has been 
some effort in consolidating the presence of an African Union peacekeeping force that has been 
clearly limited and insufficient to respond to the challenges and problems in the field.  
With the possibility of an armed humanitarian intervention out of the question due to 
the threat of China’s veto at the Security Council, committed as it is not to damage its good 
relations with the Sudanese government (which has allowed China full access to Sudanese oil 
and a large participation in the main Sudanese oil companies), the perspectives of resolution 
in the short-run are not very optimistic. It is clear that the economic, geostrategic and political 
constraints that have fed the continuous paralysis of the Security Council are the main 
obstacles to effective solutions to the crisis. 
In this scenario, the future of the country and the prospects for peace in Darfur remain 
uncertain. It seems clear, though, that the sustainable resolution of the conflict depends mainly 
on the international community’s ability to recognise and respond to the deeper causes of 
violence and on the capacity to reach an agreement within the Security Council in relation to the 
type of pressure to impose on the Sudanese government and the other belligerent parties.  
Besides Darfur, the Eastern regions of Sudan have also been kept outside the CPA’s 
peace dividends. An important centre of the Sudan’s economy and with a population of 
around four million people, composed of Arab and non-Arab populations, Eastern Sudan is 
one big paradox: although it is one of the most prosperous and rich regions, thus justifying a 
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military presence three times bigger than the one in Darfur,18 its people is one of the poorest 
of the country, subject to underdevelopment and governmental neglect (ICG, 2006: 1-2). The 
struggle for more autonomy and wealth sharing has been a reality ever since independence, 
led by the Beja Congress,19 which has resorted to violent confrontation to respond to the 
imposed fundamentalist Islamic policy of the government and the strategy of forced evictions 
for economic purposes (namely the construction of dams along the Nile). In the past few 
months, the instability in the region significantly increased reflecting a feeling of exclusion by 
the main regional groups, and directly harming the peace process. 
As long as the government in Khartoum continues to enjoy total impunity in the face 
of continuing atrocities, due to a ‘chronic’ incapacity to reach an agreement within the United 
Nations as to the need for more coercive and firm actions, the situation will obviously worsen. 
And if nothing is done, then we run the serious risk of losing interest for what is happening in 
Darfur. And it was exactly that same oblivion and lack of interest that the international 
community, after the genocide in Rwanda, promised to never repeat again. One of the lessons 
to be learnt both from the failures of the past and the current crisis in Darfur is that it is 
important that we are able and willing to keep that promise. 
 
 
Conclusion 
One of the fundamental lessons that can be drawn from this case is that the causes of conflict 
are highly complex and deep, with processes in which religious factors, although present, tend 
to assume a more subordinate role as a source of conflict (Hasenclever e Rittberger, 2000: 673).  
In the current scenario that characterizes Sudan, to evaluate whether the CPA and the 
Darfur agreements will effectively result in a sustainable and stable peace in the country, 
depends essentially on the capacity to recognize and tackle the deeper causes of these 
conflicts and, at the same time, to guarantee that both parties are truly available and willing to 
implement the provisions (Johnson, 2005). If the unity of Sudan depends on the equal and fair 
treatment of all its citizens, regardless of their religious beliefs or ethnic identities, then it 
becomes fundamental that the regime undertakes profound changes in its politics and 
applicable legislation, by adopting a more inclusive strategy. Any agreement that simply 
                                                 
18 Eastern Sudan is especially rich in oil, gold and fertile land, having also good access to the main port in the 
Red Sea and many of the pipelines that cross the country coming from the South. 
19 The Beja Congress is a political organisation created in 1985 to represent the largest tribal group in the region, 
Beja. In 2005, the Congress was associated to a smaller insurgent group know as Rashaida Free Lions.  
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reorganizes the current government, reinforcing it, will certainly put at risk any possibility of 
effective implementation in the future.  
It must be recognized, however, that despite some scepticism, peace in Sudan could 
have its opportunity and momentum. In fact, although the CPA and the other peace 
agreements seem to ignore some broader structural imbalances, these may also serve as a 
basis for a political and economic solution to the conflict in Darfur and the instability in the 
East, based on significant levels of regional autonomy and larger political participation at the 
national level. In this scenario, the best solution for peace in the country may well be not 
secession, but rather a restructured and more equal Sudan where all ethnic and religious 
groups are included and treated on an equal footage. In this scenario, next year’s elections and 
the following years until the referendum in 2011 will be crucial to guarantee stability not only 
in the South, but also in the whole country. As Douglas Johnson wisely states, “we live in 
hope, but a hope tempered by experience” (Johnson, 2004: xx). And in the case of Sudan, 
experience does not always lead to optimism.  
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